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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

~IASTIC

TILE DIVISION of the
RUBBEROID COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Re,spondent
-vs.-

Case No.
9957

A C ME DIS'TRIBU·TING COMPANY, a corporation, W. N. BEESLEY, SR. ·and SCOTT L. BEESL,EY,
Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF T·HE KIND OF CASE
This case involves two basic causes of action in
contract: first, a manufacturers .action on a promissory
note, chattel mortgage and open account against the defendant dis·tributor, a Utah corporation; second, the
manufacturers action against W. N. Beesley, Sr. and
Scott L. Beesley personally on an assignment.
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DISPOSI'TION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment against the individual and corporate
defendants. All defendants appeal from the judgment
and the amended judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
All defendants seek reversal of the judgment and
amended judgment and judgment in favor of the defendants on the assignment and note as a matter of law, or
that failing, a t.rial on the merits.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are very intricate and involved
and at best require a careful examination of ·all the instruments as well as the pleadings.
The plaintiff, Mastic Tile, is a manufaCJturer of tile
and various other products which are sold t·o distributors
for local sale. The defendant, Acme Distributing Company, did purchase from the plaintiff a number of its
products for sale in Utah. During the several years
immediately preceding March 10, 1961, the plaintiff sold
goods on open ·account to Acme Distributing Company.
By March 10, 1961, the said defendant corporation owed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the plaintiff $81,278.91 on open account. At this point
the plain tiff insisted that the defendant corporation reduce the obligation on the open account to a promissory
note. An agreement was executed on March 10, 1961
wht-reby the open account in the sum of $81,278.91 was
redtH'<'d to a promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage on all the merchandise to be sold to Acme by the

plaintiff as well as merchandise then in the inventory
of Acme. Secondly, the note was. secured by an assignment of all accounts receivable, both present and future,
which represented sales of the plaintiff's products.
It is important to note that the· entire indebtedness
of any ·type or nature which was. due from the defendant,
Acme Corporation, to the plaintiff was reduced to and
embodied in the March 10 promissory note and agreement and that no other obligation was due to the plaintiff from the defendant at that time. The agreement further provided th·at the defendant corporation would p:ay
the sum of $2,000 per month at 3% per annum. The
agreement then provided that the plaintiff would allow
the defendant to purchase on a limited open account
basis by providing that the open account must be paid
within 75 days from the invoice date. A 2% discount
\\·as granted if paid within 60 days. It was the intent
of the parties to liquidate the note as rapidly as possible
and to prevent further indebtedness.
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On March 10, 1961 a suppJemental agreement (said
agreement was not included in the pleadings before the
court when the surrunary judgment was granted) was
executed. This s11pplemental agreement provided in
paragraph 2 that if the note and the ·open account are
current, moneys collected on the assigned accounts receivable may be used in the ordinary course of business.
It further S'tated that payments received shall first he
·applied to the oldest item or charge on the account. The
oldest item or charge on the account is represented by
the promissory note. The intent of the agreement and
supplemental agreement was clear. The open account
was to be kept current and all proceeds received from
the sale of plaintiff's products were to be applied
against the note in order to liquidate that obligation as
quickly as possible.
At this point in order to fully understand the case
it must be unders:tood that Acme Distributing Company
was a Utah corporation engaged in the business of selling wholesale, various products. Prior to January, 19·61,
the primary stockho1der was W. N. Beesley, Jr., who
sold his stock interest in the corporation to his father,
W. N. Beesley, Sr. and his brother Scott L. Beesley.
At the time of the sale W. N. Beesley, Jr. owed Acme
Distributing Company $21,979.73 for advances and loans.
W. N. Beesley, Sr. and Scott L. Beesley agreed to assume
this obliga:tion. On March 10, 1961, at the same time the
agreement, supplemental agreement, note and chattel
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mortgage were executed, an assign1nent of $21,979.73
claim of Acme distributing Company against W. N.
Beesley, Jr. was made to ,the plaintiff corporation. The
plaintiff insisted that W. N. Beesley, Sr. and S.cot.t L.
Beesley acknowledge and consent personally to the
assignment. The assignment provides:
"This assignment shall be a part of that
certain agreement between them dated March 10,
1961."
This assignment has become the basic point of contention between the plaintiff and the defendant in this
litigation. The defendants all contend that no consideration was given for this assignment and that the purpose
and intent of the assignment was to secure the $81,278.91
note and upon payment of the note the security would
he discharged. The plaintiff's pleadings do not indicate
what consideration, if any, was paid nor are there any
findings of fact or conclusions of law to indicate upon
what theory the court granted the summary judgment.
On December 20, 1961, there was an extension and
modification agreement wherein it was agreed that the
original note of $81,278.91 had been reduced to $55,500\00,
that the interest rate would be reduced from 3% to 2%
per annum and that the monthly payments would be reduced from $2,000 per month. to $750 per month. It was
further agreed in paragraph 4 that the sales rebates
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which had originally been credited against the promisS!Ory note would hereafter he credited against the open
account in order to reduce the open account which was
becoming quite large.
During the course of business from March 10, 1961
to and including approximately December 1, 1962, the
promissory note obligation was reduced to $47,250.00.
However, the open account had increased from 0 dollars
to approximately $35,020.49. The defendant corporation was in default. In order to avoid an immediate foreclosure by the plaintiff corporation on all of the accounts receivable and the inventory, the pJaintiff and the
defendant corporation mutually agreed to have the inventory returned to the plaintiff corporation for full
credit less freight expense and to cooperate in the collection of the assigned accounts receivable for the benefit
of the plaintiff corporation. The plaintiff corporation,
upon accepting the inventory, gave credit to the defendant corporation of $20,487.40. The plaintiff corporation
further gave defendant corporation $19,668.27 credit on
accounts receivable. There was appro:ximately $7,353.54
in uncollected accounts receivable. Plaintiff also gave
to the defendant corporation $782.11 credit for sales rebate. The total credit was $40,937.78. The plaintiff also
received the $7,353.54 in assigned accounts receivable
not yet collected making a grand total of $48,291.32
either on hand in the form of uncollected accounts receivable or fully granted credit given by the plaintiff
to the defendant.
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The plaintiff then made its motion to the court for
a swnmary judgment. The court, upon examining the
documents and hearing arguments by counsel, granted
a ~ummary judgment against W. N. Beesley, S.r. .and
Scott L. Beesley personally in the sum of $21,979.73 on
the basis of the assignment and $19,005.73 ·together with
interest in the amount of $960.00 and attorney's fees in
the sum of $4,500.00. The judgment made no distinction
between the amount owing on the note and the .amount
owing on the open account.
Apparently the court granted the judgment in accordance with the afftdavit supporting the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. The said affidavit set up
the accounting between the parties and prorated the
inventory between the note and the open account and
applied all of the accounts receivable to the note. If
such were the case, the defendant contends that it was
improper in that both the inventory, chattel, and .assigned
receivable secured the note, and that by proper application of the collected funds and merchandise the note
would have been discharged or nearly so, and that by
prorating the inventory between the cpen account and
the no4-e, the proper payment of the note was avoided..
The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment although the defendant did file through
their attorney a counter-affidavit and a motion by the
defendant that the summary judgment be granted in
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favor of the defendants, W. N. Beesley, Sr. and Seott
L. Beesley for no cause of action on the theory that the
assignment executed by Acme Distributing Company and
the defendants personally was ·only as security ·and that
upon payment of the note there was no further need for
the assignment. The Court denied this motion. Subsequent to this denial hy the Court, the defendants did file
a motion to reconsider the court's action which was also
denied except that the amended judgment was ordered
by the court providing that as the uncollected accounts
receivable were collected, the sum should .apply against
the judgment. From these rulings of the court all of the
defendants filed notice of appeal.
STATE·MEN'T OF POIN'TS
POINT I.
THA'T THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF LAW AND FACT.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT THE COURT
AS A MATTER OF LAW ERRONEOUSLY CONS'TRUED
THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS BY PRORATING INVENTORY
IT'EMS BE:T·WEEN THE OPEN .&C'COUNT AND THE
NOTE AND BY GRANTING A JUDGMENT WHICH MADE
NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE NOTE AND THE OPEN
ACCOUNT.
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POINT III.
THE COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT AT THE TIME THE ASSIGNMENT WAS
EXECUTED, MARCH 10, 1961, IT WAS FOR SECURITY
PURPOSES ONLY.
POINT IV.
THE COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW ERRED IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, W. N. BEESLEY, SR. AND SCO'T'T L. BEESLEY, BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS CLEARLY ESTABLISH
THAT BY PROPER APPLICATION OF MONEYS RECEIVED,
THE NOTE SECURED BY THE PERSONAL ASSIGNMENT
WAS LIQUIDATED THEREBY RELIEVING PERSONAL
DEFENDANTS OF FURTHER LIABILITY, SINCE THE
ASSIGNMENT WAS MADE AS SECURITY FOR THE DEBT
WHICH EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE ASSIGNMENT
AND NOT FOR FUTURE DEBTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S l\IOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF LAW AND FACT.

The undisputed law in this jurisdietion as well as
other jurisdictions is that sununary judgments will be
granted only when there are no material issues of law
or fact in dispute. Therefore the court should not grant
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summary judgments where there are meritorious daims
and defenses. In the case of Kidman v. White v. Jones,
third party plaintiff, v. Wade, third ptarty defendant,
3'78 Pac 2d 898 p. 900, the Court said :
"In confronting the problem presented on
this appeal we have been ·obJiged to remain aware
that. a summary judgment, which turns a party
out of court without an opportunity to present
his evidence, is a harsh mea;sure that should be
granted only when, taking the view most favorable to a party's claims and any proof that might
properly be adduced thereunder, he could in no
event prevail. That both parties hereto make
plausible arguments that the contract in question
is so manifestly in their favor that reasonable
minds could not see if the other way is a pointed
commentary of the ability of the human mind to
rationalize in its own interests. It is equally so
upon the desirability and the propriety of resoJving any doubts in favor of permitting courts and
juries t'O settle such disputes rather than ruling
upon them summarily as was done here."
The court further s.tated in the case of Samms v.
Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 Pac. 2d 344 at p. 355:
"A motion for summary judgment is in effect
a demurrer to the claims of the plaintiff, saying:
assuming they are true, no right to recover is
shown. It is regarded as a harsh measure which
the courts .are reluctant to sanction because it
deprives the adverse party of an opportunity
to present the evidence concerning her grievance
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for adjudication. For this reason plaintiff's oont('ntions must be considered in the light most to
her advantage and all doubts resolved in favor
of permitting her to go to trial; and only if when
the whole matter is so viewed, she could, neverthelP~s, establish no right to recovery, should the
motion be granted."
In another Utah case, Morris v. Farnsworth Motel,
1~:1 Utah 289, 259 Pac. 297 the Supreme affirmed a summary judgment; however at page 299 the Court stated:
"Although we are sensitive of the duty of
courts to safeguard the right of citizens to have
grievances fully tried on the merits to courts and
juries under proper circumstances, this does not
lead to the necessity or desirability of such submission where, taking the evidence and all fair
inferences therefrom most favorable to a plaintiff,
all reasonable minds must yet conclude that his
own lack of due care proximately contributed to
cause his injury.''

-n

That this is the general law is further supported in
Am. Jur. Sec. 342 at p. 525.
"If there are issues of fact, the motion f'or
Slunmary judgement is denied, or, in some jurisdictions, the issues are narrowed to the material
facts which are actually .and in good faith controverted. If there are no questions of fact, the
judge applies the law in accordance with the adInitted facts as disclosed by the affidavits. The
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sit~:mtion corresponds to that of a judge directing
a Jury to render a verdict on admitted facts in
the plaintiff's favor.

"·These affidavits stand on a different footing than those in which the trial judge is determining a question of fact on affidavits. If the
affidavit of defense shows a substantial issue of
fact, summary judgment should not be ordered
even though the affidavit is disbelieved. If the
affidavits on the one side and on the other are
directly opposed as to the facts shown, the case
must go to trial. Oral evidence is not admissible,
nor are interrogatories propounded for the purpose of discovery, where the statutes or rules
under which they are propounded do not contemplate their use."
Applying these basic principles of law to the instant
case the pleadings clearly show material issues exist.
First, there is a dispute as to the allocation of funds obtained from the return of merchandise inventory and
collected accounts receivable. The plaintiff contends that
the inventory may be prorated between the balance owing
on the note and the balance on the open account. The defendants aU contend that all of the accounts receivable
and all of the inventory returned must be applied to
the note as is clearly set forth in the agreement of March

10, 19'61.
Secondly, the plaintiff and defendants take opposite
positions as to the purpose of the assignment which was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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PXP<·uted .March 10, 1961. The plaintiff's complaint al-

leges Inerely t; 111 t the assignment was executed on March
10, 1~)(; t and are entitled to judgment on the assignment.
The defendants, however, in their answer and in the
t•otmtPr affidavit opposing the motion for summary
judgment specifically allege that no consideration was
givPn for the assignment and that the only purp·ose for
the assign1nent was f.or security purposes. The assignment was to secure the promissory note dated March
l 0, 1961. It is apparent that this difference of opinion
cannot be resolved from the pleadings alone. It would
be necesS'ary to have testimony taken in order to determine what was the .actual intent and purpose of the
assignment.
Thirdly, there is a material issue with reference to
,,·hat, if any, attorney's fees should be granted to the
plaintiff and charged against the defendant corporation.
Paragraph 10 of the plaintiff's affidavit supporting
his motion for summary judgment alleges that reasonable attorney's fees are: "$4700.00 appHcahle to the note
and $3500.00 applicable to the chattel mortgage." The
defendants, in paragraph 7 of their counter affidavit,
eon tended it is not possible to have .attorney's fees assessed both on the promissory note and a second attorney's
fee on the chattel mortgage which secures the note. This
eertainly would be a duplication of attorney''s fees. Despite this dispute as to assessment of attorney fees, the
Court awarded an attorney fee of $4500.00 and in no
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way indicated whether it was based upon the: note, the
chattel mortgage, or both. With reference to attorney
fees it is further alleged by the defendants that by proper
application of the: eredits the notes might very well be
satisfied, in which event no attorney fees could be assess~
ed. Therefore, it is apparent that the Court must make
a distinction as to moneys owed on the note and moneys
owed on the open account before attorney fees can he
assessed. The lower court apparently ignored this important distinction.
Fourth, a supplemental agreement dated March
10, 1961, was not mBJde part of the pleadings by the
plaintiff. The defendants have argued that all of the
documents must he before the court in order to have a
full understanding of the case. The defendants in their
answer and their counterclaim have alleged the existence
and importance o.f the SuppJemental Agreement which
is an integral part o.f the Agreement iitself. Paragraph
2 of the supplemental agreement states: "Payments to
Acme on said assigned account shall be applied to the
oldest item or charge on the account." The defendants
contend that all of the assigned accounts receivable apply to the note and carry out the general intent of the
parties that the note was to be liquidated as rapidly as
possible. To some extent, the plaintiff must agree with
this position because in their pleadings they allege that
all of the accounts re:ceivable collected were credited to
the note. Enlarging upon this intent, it becomes increasSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ingly apparent that it was the desire of he parties to provide as much security as possible on the note obligation.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT THE COURT
AS A MATTER OF LAW ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED
THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS BY PRORATING INVENTORY
ITEMS BETWEEN THE OPEN A:CCOUNT AND THE
NOTE AND BY GRANTING A JUDGMENT WHICH MADE
NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE NOTE AND THE OPEN
ACCOUNT.

The judgment against the personal defendants in the
of $21,979.73 was granted on the assignment and
\ras not considered by the Court as security on the note.
A judgment ·of $19,005.73 was against the corporation
only and made no distinction as to whether it applied
to the note or the open account. The interest in the sum
of $960 and the attorney's fee of $4500 were judgments
against the corporation only but it is not !lmown whether
the interest or attorney fees were based on the note or
the open account In determining what was intended by
the parties it is necessary to construe all of the instruments together, one of which was not included in p1ainSillll

tiff's complaint. The basic agreement is the document
entitled "Agreeement" and dated March 10, 1961 and this
document clearly spells out the intent of the parties in
that Paragraph 2 provides :
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"To secure the payment of said promissory
note .Acme agrees : (a) to execute and deliver
to Mastic a chattel mortgage . . . (b) to se:ll,
assign, and transfer to Mastic all its accounts
receivable ... "
Then referring to Paragraph 4 the agreement
states:
""From and after the 1st day of January,
1961, .all purchases from Mastic by Acme shall be
at 2% discount if paid within 60 days from the
invoice date and net if paid thereafter provided
that all payments to Mastic shall be the net invoice amount and if paid within the discount
period Mastic agrees to credit the discount to
the unpaid balance of the promissory note mentioned above provided further that all invoices
shall be paid not later than 75 days from invoice
date."
It is apparent from these two provisions of the
agreeement that the note was to be fully secured and paid
off as rapidly as possible pursuant to the terms of the
agreement and that the open account was to be kept
current at all times thus preventing the building up of
a large open account which had created the trouble in the
beginning. Therefore, at the time of the execution of
the agreement the old open account was reduced to a
promissory note and there was no other indebtedness
owing by the defendant corporation to the plaintiff.
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The assignment, dated March 10, 1961, provide in
the last paragraph :
"It is agreed by Acme Distributing Company,
Inc. and Mastic Tile Division of Rubberoid Company, assignor and assignee, respectively, that
this assignment shall be a part of that certain
agreement between them, dated March 10, 19·61."

It is obvious that at the time this assignment was
executed the only outstanding obligation was the note ;
therefore it must necessarily indicate that the intent of
the parties was to protect the plaintiff against the possibility of los·s on the note, there being no other obligation
in existance at that time to which the assignment could
apply. This is especially true when no consideration was
given for the assignment.
The supplemental agreement dated March 10, 1961,
in Paragraph 2 states :
"Payments to Acme on said assigned account shall he applied to the oldest item or charge
on the account."
The agreement provides that the receivable shall be
assigned as security to the promissory note. Therefore,
it is logical and certainly the intent of the party that the
funds from the assigned receivables are to be applied to"~ard the payment of the note. If the assigned accounts
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receivable were to be used in the payment and liquidation of the open account, this in effect would destroy the
very purpose of the original assignment which was to
secure the note itself. The reading of the documents together conclusively points out that it was the plaintiff's
intent to compel the liquidation of the old account hy
paying off a promissory note at the rate of $2000 per
month. The open account, in order to be kept current,
must be paid not only from the revenues derived from
the sale of the plaintiff's products but also from the
revenues derived generally from all sales. Certainly no
one can contend that the sale of the plaintiff's products
alone would give sufficient profit to both liquidate the
note and the open account.
The agreement provides that in the event of default
on the payments on the note, there can be foreclosure
proceedings against the security. Rather than have a
foreclosure through the Court, the inventory and the
accounts receiv~ble were returned to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff did apply all of the proceeds from the accounts
receivable that had been collected to the note. HoweveT, the plaintiff prorated the returned inventory hetween the balance of $47,250.00 on the note and the $35,020.49 on the open account. The affidavit suppo·rting the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment clearly sets
out this proration accounting. It is contrary to the provisions of the agreement which was prepared by the
plaintiff and signed by the defendants. It is apparent
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that the basic reason for the proration in violation of
the agreement was to leave a large balance still owing
on the note which could then be liquidated by funds obtained from the assignment, and in this way compel
personal liability. All of the inventory credits and all
of the accotmts receivable credits should have been applied to the promissory note pursuant to the agreement.
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts this would have
resulted in reducing the balance on the note from $47,250
to $6,312.22. Therefore, by proper construction of the
instruments there could have been no gre·ater personal
liability on the .assignment than $6,312.22 plus costs and
attorney fees as provided by the note. However, it must
be kept in mind that at the time the action was commenced, there was still approximately $7,353.54 in assigned accounts receivable not yet collected. If this
amount had been collected in full, the note would have
been fully satisfied. In such an event there would have
been no personal liability whatsoever.
The only other instrument of significance is the Extension and Modification Agreement dated December 20,
1961. Paragraph 1 of that instrument indicates that the
note had been reduced to $55,500.00. Because of the reduction of the balance, the monthly payments and interest rates were reduced. However, to further protect
the obligation of the note, Paragraph 4 provided that
sales rebates which had heretofore been applied to the
note would in the future be credited against the open
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account to prevent the open account from getting too
large. This modification in itself hears out the intent
of the parties in fully securing a note in the first instance, .and that there was originally no intent to secure
in any fashion the open account. It was only when the
open account began increasing in size that steps were
taken to in some way prevent the recurrance of another
huge indebtedness.
Considering all of these instruments together in the
light of the original intent of the parties the Court was
in error in prorating the inventory against the balance
owing on the open account as well as the note. The court
should have followed the instruments of the parties and
applied all of the merchandise returned to the note. Pollowing this construction of the instruments, the findings
of attorney fees, interest, and personal liability would
have been substantially different.
POINT III.
THE COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT AT THE TIME THE ASSIGNMENT WAS
EXECUTED, MARCH 10, 1961, IT WAS FOR SECURITY
PURPOSES ONLY.

The only existing debt between the plaintiff Mastic
Tile and the defendant Acme Distributing Company, Inc.,
at the time of the March 10 agreement was the $81,278.91
open account which was reduced to the promissory note.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
This debt had arisen as a result of past purchases on open
account. No further loan was extended to the defendant
at the time of the note. It was contemplated that further
pnrelta:sPs would be made on open account but that the
have plaintiff did not want the accounts to raise above a
nominal level and prolong or increase the insecure finaneial position of the defendant, Acme Corporation. It was
possible at the time of the agreement that Acme may
never have incurred further debts on open account. The
plaintiff contends that there was a general assignment
of the W. N. Beesley, Jr. obligation. If there were a
general assignment of that obligation, the plaintiff would
have the legal right to coUect the full value of the assignment from W. N. Beesley, Jr., W. N. Beesley, Sr., and
Scott L. Beesley regardless of any other agreement the
parties may have entered into This would give the
plaintiff the right to collect $21,979.73 on the assignment.
·rhis right wo-uld exist in addition to and regardless of
any other right to collect on the note. The plaintiff had
the right to collect on the note whether or not there was
an assignment and whether the assignment was general
or merely as security. No one disputes the $81,278.91 indt'btedness; however, if the assignment is to be considered general in character and given for good and valuable consideration, and the note also considered valid
as the plaintiff contends, the plaintiff would have the
legal zh}. to f.<i}ect not only the $81,278.91 hut the additional $~~,.9i making a total of 103,259.64. It is inconceivable that individuals, ·whether they be officers or
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not, would place themselves in the unprotected position
of making themselves personally liable by an outright
grant of $21,979.73 whether the note was paid or not.
The plaintiff contends that there was consideration
paid for the assignment. This would require testimony
because the pleadings of the plaintiff do not, in any
way, indicate what if any consideration was given. On
the other hand, the defendants repeatedly contended
that the assignment was for security only and that the
personal defendants did not intend to hold themselves
out for personal liability on an unlimited basis. The defendants should have a right in Court to present their
position.
POINT IV.
THE COURT AS A MAT'TER OF LAW ERRED IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, W. N. BEESLEY, SR. AND SCOTT L. BEESLEY, BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS CLEARLY ESTABLISH
THAT BY PROPER APPLICATION OF MONEYS RECEIVED,
THE NOTE SE'CURED BY THE PERSONAL ASSIGNMENT
WAS LIQUIDA'TED THEREBY RELIEVING PERSONAL
DEFENDANTS OF FURTHER LIABILITY, SINCE THE
ASSIGNMENT WAS MADE AS SECURITY FOR THE DEBT
WHICH EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE ASSIGNMENT
AND NOT FOR FUTURE DEBTS.

At the time of the assignment of the defendant, Acme
Distributing Company, Inc., was in serious financial
trouble, and the defendants contended that the debts
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Pxi~·ding at the time should be consolidated into one note
and that the note should be secured by the assignment as
well as the accounts receivable and chattel mortgage. It
was not the intent of the parties that there should he a
substantial future additional extension of credit. In f.aet,
the docurnents indicated there was not to be any type of
~ubstnntial extension of lines of credit but that the open
accotmt was to be :kept current at all times. Therefore,
there was no need to apply the assignment as security
for any future debts between the defendant and the
plaintiff. If the assignments were to apply to future
debts or some other obligation than the note, then the
agreement must specifically so state. The Colorado
Supreme Oourt in expressing the general rule on this
subject stated in Horton v. McFerson, 30 Pae. 2d, 256
~1-1- Colo. 361, at p. 258 :

" ... a pledge to secure a specific debt cannot
be held by the pledgee as security for any other
obligation, except by express agreement between
the pledgor and pledgee."
The intention of the parties in this situation was
that the assignment was only for the note and not for
future debts. Even if the parties had intended that the
assignment was for the future open account indebtedness
which may or may not have arisen, the pledge for the
future accounts would have been ineffective because it
was not expressly included in the assignment. This rule
is based on sound reasoning. A pledge in the hands of a
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pledgee remains the property of the pledgor and he has
the right to decide how the propeTty should he disposed
of subject to the limited rights of the pJedgee. It is
presumed that the pledgor did not intend to give away
any rights in the property which he did not do so expressly.
The intention of the parties being to liquidate the
note and to absolutely prevent any future obJigation in
accumulating, it is inconceivable that the assignment
could have been for a future debt which they were attempting to avoid in every way possible.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is submitted:
1. ·The Trial Court has erred in granting a summary judgment in that there are material issues of law
and fact which may be resolved only by the Oourt hearing
testimony.
2. ~The ruling of the Court in allowing a proration of
inventory credits between the open account and the note
is contrary to the instrument itself.
3. The documents themselves clearly establish the
intent of the parties to liquidate the existing obligation
and to prevent future indebtedness.
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+. The assignment was for security purposes only
and the personal liability was limited to securing a
promissory note to the extent of the assignment. Upon
the payment of the note, the security in the form of the
assignment was discharged or should have been discharged.
THEREFORE, the summary judgment should be
reversed and the matter remanded to the District Court
for a trial on its merits.
B~spectfully

submitted,

BE.ASLIN, NYGAARD & COKE
By HENRY S. NYGAARD
Attorneys for Defenda;n.tsAppella!nts
513 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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